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VIEWPOINT       
 
 
Sarah Spiekermann* 
 
 
The Challenges of Privacy-by-Design 
 
Heralded by regulators, Privacy by Design (PbD) holds the promise to solve the digital 
world’s privacy problems. But immense challenges lie ahead: Real management 
commitment and concrete step-by-step methods to integrate privacy into systems are 
just the tip of the iceberg. 
 
Privacy maintenance and control is a social value deeply embedded in our societies. A 
global survey found that 88% of people are worried about who has access to their 
data; over 80% expect governments to regulate privacy and impose penalties on 
companies that don’t use data responsibly. But privacy regulation is not easy. The 
Internet’s current economics as well as national security management benefit from 
the collection and use of rich user profiles. Technology constantly changes. And data is 
like water: it flows and ripples in a way that is hard to predict. As a result, even a 
well-conceived, general and sustainable privacy regulation, such as the European Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC, struggles to ensure its effectiveness. Companies 
regularly test legal boundaries and many  risk sanctions for privacy breach to avoid 
constraining their business. 
 
Against this background, the European Commission and other regulatory bodies are 
looking for a more effective, system- and context-specific balance between citizens’ 
privacy rights and the data needs of companies and governments. The apparent 
solution, heralded in many legal documents, but barely specified, is  “Privacy by 
Design”. At first sight, the powerful term seems to suggest that we simply need to 
take a few ‘PETs’ (Privacy Enhancing Technologies) and add a good dose of security, 
thereby creating a fault-proof systems’ landscape for the future. But the reality is 
much more challenging. According to Ann Cavoukian the Ontario information and 
privacy commissioner who first coined the term, PbD, stands for a pro-active 
integration of technical privacy principles in a system’s design (such as privacy 
default settings or end-to-end security of personal data) and the recognition of 
privacy in a company’s risk management processes.1  PbD can thus be defined as a 
pro-active engineering and management approach that is committed to 
selectively and sustainably minimize information systems’ privacy risks 
through technical and governance controls.  
 
However, a core challenge for PbD is to get organizations’ management involved in 
the privacy strategy. Management’s active involvement in the corporate privacy 
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strategy is key because personal data is the asset at the heart of many companies’ 
business models today. High privacy standards can restrict the collection and use of 
data for further analysis, limit strategic options and impact a firm’s bottom line. 
Consider advertising revenues boosted by behavioral targeting practices and peoples’ 
presence on social networking sites: Without personal data, such services are 
unthinkable. PbD proponents hardly embrace this economic reality in their 
reasoning.  Instead, they take a threat perspective arguing that low privacy standards, 
can provoke media backlash and lead to costly legal trials around privacy breaches.  
And indeed, distrust caused by privacy breaches is probably the only real blemish on 
the image of technology companies such as Google or Facebook. Brands are a 
precious company asset, the most difficult to build and the most costly to maintain. 
Hence, brand managers should be keen to avoid privacy risks. Equally, recent data 
breach scandals have forced CEOs to quit. Despite these developments, many 
managers still do not understand that a sustainable strategy for one of their 
company’s core assets – personal data – requires them to actively manage this asset. 
Managing personal data means to optimize its strategic use, its quality and long-term 
availability. Unfortunately, few of today’s managers want to take on this new 
challenge. Instead, they ‘milk’ what they can from the information bits that they get 
and leave the privacy issue as a nuisance that is better left to be fixed by their 
lawyers.  
 
But even if managers took up the privacy challenge and incorporated the active 
governance of personal data into their companies’ strategic asset management, they 
would not be able to determine the right strategy without their IT departments: PbD 
requires the guts and ingenuity of engineers. As the term implies, the design of 
systems needs to be altered or focused to technically embrace the protection of 
peoples’ data. Consequently, privacy must be on engineers’ requirements radar from 
the start of a new IT project. It needs to enter the system development life cycle at 
such an early point that architectural decisions around data processing, transfer and 
storage can still be made.  Managers and engineers (as well as other potential 
stakeholders) need to assess the privacy risks that they are willing to take and jointly 
decide on technical and governance controls for those risks that they are not willing 
to bear.  
 
Even when both managers and engineers are committed to PbD, more challenges 
must be overcome: 
 Privacy is a fuzzy concept and is thus difficult to protect. We need to come to 
terms on what it is we want to protect. Moreover, conceptually and 
methodologically, privacy is often confounded with security. We need to start 
distinguishing security from privacy to know what to address with what means. 
 No agreed-upon methodology supports the systematic engineering of privacy into 
systems. System development life cycles rarely leave room for privacy 
considerations. 
 Little knowledge exists about the tangible and intangible benefits and risks 
associated with companies’ privacy practices. 
 
  
How can these challenges be overcome? A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) 
Framework recently created for RFID technology2 has been called a ‘landmark for 
PbD’ because it offers some answers: The PIA Framework suggests to use concrete 
privacy protection goals and describes a method to reach them.  Pragmatically, it 
recommends that organizations use the specific legislative privacy principles of their 
region or sector or the OECD Privacy guidelines as a starting point to determine 
privacy protection goals. In Europe, for example, the European Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC defines the following privacy goals:  
 
 Safeguarding personal data quality through data avoidance, purpose-specific 
processing and transparency vis-à-vis data subjects  
 Ensuring the legitimacy of personal and sensitive data processing 
 Complying with data subjects’ right to be informed, to object to the processing of 
their data, and to access, correct and erase personal data.  
 Ensuring confidentiality and security of personal data 
 
Security and privacy in this view are clearly distinguished. Security means that the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of personal data are ensured. From a data 
protection perspective security is one of several means to ensure privacy. A good PbD 
is unthinkable without a good Security by Design plan. The two approaches are in a 
“positive sum” relationship. That said, privacy is about the scarcity of personal data 
creation and the maximization of individuals’ control over their personal data. As a 
result, some worry that PbD could undermine law enforcement techniques that use 
criminals’ data traces to find and convict them. More research and international 
agreement in areas such as anonymity revocation are certainly needed to show that 
this need not be the case even if we have privacy friendly systems. 
 
After privacy goals are clearly defined, we must identify how to reach them. The PIA 
Framework3 mentioned above is built on the assumption that a PbD methodology 
could largely resemble security risk assessment processes such as NIST or ISO/IEC 
27005. These risk assessment processes identify potential threats to each protection 
goal. These threats and their probabilities constitute a respective privacy risk. All 
threats are then systematically mitigated by technical or governance controls.  Where 
this cannot be done, remaining risks are documented to be addressed later.  
 
As in security engineering PbD controls heavily rely on systems’ architectures3 
Privacy scholars still put too much focus on information practices only (such as 
Website privacy policies) that are used to ‘fix’ privacy problems by informing users 
about them. Instead, they should investigate more how to pro-actively build systems 
in client-centric ways that maximize user control and minimize network or service 
provider involvement . Where such privacy-friendly architectures aren’t feasible 
(often for business reasons), designers can support PbD by using technically 
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enforceable default policies (i.e. ‘opt-out’ settings) or data scarcity policies (i.e. 
erasure or granularity policies), data portability and user access- and delete rights. 
Where such technical defaults aren’t feasible, concise, accurate and easy to 
understand notices of data-handling practices and contact points for user control and 
redress should come into play.  
 
A challenge, however, is that system development life cycles and organizational 
engineering processes do not consider such practices. So far, privacy is simply not on 
an engineer’s plate when designing a system. This gap raises many questions: When 
should privacy requirements first enter the system development life cycle? Who 
should be responsible? Given that privacy controls impact business goals, who can 
actually decide on appropriate measures? Must there be ongoing privacy 
management and practices monitoring? If organizations purchase standard software 
solutions or outsource operations, pass data to third parties or franchise their brands, 
who is responsible for customer privacy? How can PbD be audited so that companies 
can demonstrate their privacy accountability? 
 
For privacy to be embedded in the system development life cycle and hence in 
organizational processes, companies must be ready to embrace the domain. Here, we 
return to the starting point. Unfortunately, we still have too little knowledge about the 
real damage that is being done to brands and a company’s reputation when privacy 
breaches occur. The stock market sees some negligible short-term dips, but people 
flock to data-intensive services (such as social networks); so far, they don’t sanction 
companies for privacy breaches. So why invest in PbD measures? Will there be any 
tangible benefits from PbD that justifies the investment? Would people perhaps be 
willing to pay for advertisement-free, privacy friendly services? Will they incur 
switching cost and move to competitive services that are more privacy friendly?  
Would the 83% of US consumers who claim that they would stop doing business with 
a company that breaches their privacy really do so? I believe that we need to better 
understand these dynamics as well as the current changes in the social perception of 
what we regard as private. But research on the behavioral economics of privacy has 
clearly demonstrated that regardless of what people say, they make irrational privacy 
decisions and systematically underestimate long-term privacy risks. And this is not 
only the case for privacy-seeking individuals, but also for managers who are making 
PbD decisions for their companies. Therefore, I believe that PIAs should be seriously 
considered in legislation as well as self-regulation. They must however be credible by 
providing a  precise set of rules against which their effectiveness (and legel certainty) 
can be verified. They must be auditable! If this is the case, PIAs make privacy risks 
transparent and help companies to take accountable actions. Making them mandatory 
through EU data protection regulation or in US privacy sector laws or adding them to 
international privacy agreements such as the EU-US Safe-Harbor Framework 
(overseen by the FTC) would force us to embrace process-driven, bottom-up ways to 
embed privacy into code; probably the only way to really protect one of the core 
ethical values of our Western liberal democracies and constitutions. 
